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stitutional provision, or to legislation to provide for the preservation
and practical security of such right, and for influencing and governing the judgment and conscience of all legislators and magistrates,
who are thus required to recognize and respect such rights.
In answer to the second question proposed, we are of opinion
that the Act of Congress above cited, as to all matters therein provided for, except so far as it may have been changed by subsequent Acts, has such force in this Commonwealth; independently
of and notwithstanding any State legislation, that all officers undr
State government, civil and military, are bound by its provisions.

RECENT

ENGLISH DECISIONS.

ne Court of ExChequer.
CORNMAN VS. THE EASTERN COUNTIES RAILWAY COMPANY.
1. In an action against a railway company for negligence, in consequence of which
'the plaintiff has suffered injury, it is for the judge to decide whether. there is any
reasonable evidence of negligence proper to be left to the jury.
2. A railway company kept at their station a weighing machine on a platform close
to the railway. On a particular occasion the plaintiff, being there to receive a
parcel, was thrown against the weighing machine and injured :-Held, that
whether there was evidence that the company were guilty of negligence in keeping the weigbing machine where they did, was to-be determined by the judge, on
consideration of all the circumstances of the case.

The declaration alleged that the defendants were owners and proprietors of a railway for the carriage and conveyance of passengers
and parcels for hire and reward, and were possessed of a railway
station and platform abutting on it, upon, along, and over which
all persons lawfully being at the station were used and accustomed
and authorized by the defendants to pass and repass ; that the
plaintiff was expecting and about to receive a parcel then carried
and conveyed by a certain train by the defendants at their request
for reward, and to receive which parcel the defendants had autho-

rized him to go and pass and repass upon, along, and over the plat-
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form, the same being then the regular, usual and accustomed way
for him to go and pass and repass for the purpose aforesaid. It
then alleged that the defendants carelessly, negligently, and improperly suffered and permitted a certain weighing machine to be and
remain upon the platform in an unreasonable and improper place,
and a place that was highly dangerous to persons going, passing,
and repassing upon, along, and over the platform, in case the same
should be greatly crowded with persons, and then suffered and peritted the platform to be so greatly crowded, without taking or
using due, reasonable, proper, or any means or precautions to prevent accidents or injuries arising or happening to the plaintiff and
the other persons who were then lawfully upon the platform, whereby
the plaintiff, whilst upon the platform, while there with the license
and consent of the defendants, became and was, solely on account
of the careless, negligent, and improper conduct of the defendants,
and for want of such due, reasonable, and proper steps, means, and
precautions, &c., cast and thrown upon and over the weighing
machine, down to the ground, and was greatly hurt, &c. Plea, not
guilty. At the trial, before Ohannell, B., it appeared that the
defendants had a railway station at Shoreditch, the platform of
which was of solid earth and soil. Upon the platform, and close
up to the railway, and out of the way of the persons coming in from
the gates of the station, the defendants had placed a large weighing
machine for goods, which had stood there for five years previous to
the occasion in question, during all which period no complaint had
ever been made of the weighing machine being placed where it was,
although on one occasion a gentleman had been slightly injured by
falling back upon it. On Christmas day the plaintiff went to the
station to receive a parcel which was expected to come by a train,
on the arrival of which, being either pressed by the number of perpersQns who had alighted from the train, or owing to some misfortune of his own, the origin of which did not appear, he fell against
the weighing machine and met with an injury. On this evidence.
the plaintiff obtained a verdict, the judge reserving leave to enter a
nonsuit if the court should think there was no evidence of negligence
proper to be left to the jury. A rule having been obtained, it was
this day argued, when
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Parry, Serjt., and Hf. James showed cause, citing Barnes vs.
Ward, 9 C. B. 392; 3Mlartin vs. Vi~e Great Yorthern Railway
Company, 16 0. B. 179 ; Toomey vs. The Brighton Railway Company, 3 0. B. N. S., 146 ; and Southeote vs. Stanley, 1 H. &
Norm. 247.)
Ballantine, Serjt., and Holland, who appeared to support the
rule, were stopped by the court.
MARTIN, B.-I have no hesitation in declaring that, in my judgment, there was no case for the jury. In the declaration there are
several averments relative to the plaintiff having been lawfully at
the place when the accident happened, &c., as to the effect of which
I give no opinion, for, even dupposing them unnecessary averments,
unnecessary averments produce no effect, In all cases of this nature
the primary question to consider is, was there any evidence of negligence at all ? and that question is to be determined by the judge.
If the defendants had left an open place into which a man might
fall and be hurt, that would be evidence of negligence; but there is
nothing of the sort here, and on the whole of the case I can see no
evidence of negligence by the defendants. If so, the present action
does not lie, for if the injury which the plaintiff received -was the
result of misfortune, he must bear it. Although, as I understand,
my Brother Parry at the trial avoided commenting to the jury
about the defendants being a railway company, the mischievous

effect on the minds of the jury is fully produced by the bare statement that they are a railway company. Suppose this injury had
been done in a timber yard, no jury would find negligence against
the owner of it ; but with these unhappy railway companies it is
different, for jurors and many others think that if an accident happens within the gate of a railway company's premises, there should
always be a verdict against the company. This rule to enter a nonsuit must therefore be made absolute.
B.-I had considerable doubt in this case at first,
though certainly not from disinclination to take care of railwaycompanies, which I agree with my Brother Martin, are often ill-used
BRAMWELL,
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by juries; but I am now satisfied there was no evidence for the
jury, and consequently, that this rule should be made absolute. I
am disposed to adopt the language of Williams, J., when delivering
judgment in Toomey vs. The Brighton Bailway Company, 3 0. B.,
N. S., 146, and which is in accordance with that used to-day by my
Brother Martin: "It is not enough to say that there was some
evidence.

.

.

.

A scintilla of evidence, or a mere surmise that

there may have been negligence on the part of the defendants, clearly
would not justify the judge in leaving the case to the jury; there
must have been evidence on which they might reasonably and properly conclude that there was negligence." Every person of any
experience in courts of justice knows that a scintilla of evidence
against a railway company is enough to secure a verdict for the
plaintiff. I was once in a case before a most able judge, the late
Chief Justice Jervis, in which I was beaten, I dare say rightly, in
consequence of an observation of his-" Nothing is so easy as to be
wise after the event." No human being ever suggested that any
mischief was likely to arise from a weighing machine placed as this
was, and how, therefore could the company anticipate any? On
the contrary, they might fairly expect that there would be none,
when for year after year company after company had had weighing
machines in similar positions, and no harm ever resulted from
them.
WATSON, B.-I am of the same opinion. It is necessary for a
railway company to haye a weighing machine, and this, one was
close up to the railway itaelf, and quite out of the transit from the
gates of the station. Possibly a great number of persons may have
come like an eddy and swept up to the plaintiff when standing by
the weighing machine, and so produced the injury, but the cause of
it was the weighing machine standing there. Was that, then, a
negligent act on the part of the defendants? if it was, the same
might be said of the parcel office, in case a number of persons had
twisted the plaintiff round and knocked him against it. The injury
here really arose out of the constitution of the place itself, from an
object which in the daylight every person with his eyes about him
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could see. If there had been a pitfall there it would be a totally
different thing, for a company have no right to put pitfalls in the
way of persons who go to their premiset on business.
B.-In some particular cases it is often a most difficult question to determine whether there is a scintilla of evidence
for a jury. My impression at the trial was, that there was none in
this case, and the discussion of to-day has fully satisfied me that that
view was correct. The plaintiff was lawfully on this platform, close
by this weighing machine, which had been in that place for five
years, during which no accident occurred, for although on one occasion a gentleman was hurt by falling against the weighing machine,
no complaint was made about it. If this platform, instead of being
of solid earth and soil, were a flooring, not sufficient to bear the
weight of persons who came on Christmas day, or when excursion
trains were starting or arriving, there would be a clear case of negligence against the company. Here there was none.-Rule absoCiHAiNz.LL,

lute.

In the Court of Common Pleas-Hilary Term.
LANCASTER AND ANOTHER VS. EVE AND ANOTHER.
1. It is a question of evidence, depending on circumstances and the intention of the
parties, whether A's chattel, fixed on Vs soil, becomes part of the soil, or remains
the chattel of A.
2. Piles fixed in the bed of the Thames, in front of a wharf, for the purpose of
mooring vessels tuaking to the wharf, and long enjoyed for such purpose without
interruption by the crown or the conservators of the river, will be taken to have
been put down in the exercise of an easement, and to remain as chattels in the
owners of the wharf, so as to give them a right of action against any one injuring
the piles.

The declaration stited that at the time when, &c.the plaintiffs were,
possessed of a wharf near to and adjoining the river Thames, and
of a certain pile of wood lawfully driven into the ground near thereto,
and in and by the side of the said river; and the defendants were
possessed of a barge, and had,-by their servants, the care, manage12
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ment, and direction of the same, and were navigating and using it
on the said river; yet the defendants, by their said servants, took
so little and such bad and improper care of their said barge, and
governed, managed, navigated, and directed the same in so careless,
negligent; and improper a manner, that the same, by and through
the carelessness, negligence, and unskilfulness, misdirectibn, mismanagement, and improper conduct of the defendants, by their said
servants in that behalf, then, with force and violence, came and ran
foul of and upon and against the said pile, and thereby broke,
damaged, and injured the said pile, whereby the plaintiffs were put
to and incurred great expense in repairing the said damage and
injury, and in placing and fixing a new pile in the ground in lieu of
the said pile so broken and damaged as aforesaid, and they were
and are otherwise injured thereby. Pleas-first, not guilty; secondly,
not possesed of the pile; thirdly, that the pile was at the same time
when, &c., unlawfully driven and fixed into the soil andbed of the
said river Thames, the same being a public and common navigable
river and a common highway, and into and on a part thereof where
the said river was so public and common and navigable, and such
common highway as aforesaid, ahd where all the liege subjects, &c.,
at the said time when, &c., had a right to, and lawfully ought to and
might, pass and repass with, and navigate and conduct, their vessels, and barges, at their free will and pleasure, at all times of the
year ; and that the said pile of wood, so there driven and fixed, was
unlawfully and improperly obstructing the passage of the said part of
the said river and highway; and that the defendants having occasion
for their said barge to pass in and along the said part of t1fe said river,
as they were lawfully entitled to do, the said barge, against the will of
the defendants and their said servants, was carried and driven by the
force and pressure of the tide and stream, thereupon, and against
the said pile of wood so there unlawfully being, and the same then
being old,-infirm, and decayed, and unfit to be left in that, position
by the plaintiffs, of which the defendants and their said servants
had no notice, the same became and was broken and injured, as in
the declaration mentioned, and that the damage and injury arose
and was occasioned by means of the premises in this plea mentioned,
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and not otherwise.

Issues on all the pleas.

The case came on to

be tried, at the sittings after Trinity Term, 1858, at Guildhall,

before Crowder, J., when a verdict was found for the plaintiffs on the
issue on the second plea. In Michaelmas Term, 1858,
DowdesweUl obtained a rule, calling on the plaintiffs to show
cause why the verdict should not be set aside, andinstead thereof a verdict be entered for the defendants on such plea, or why a nonsuit
should not be entered pursuant to leave reserved, on the ground
that the pile in question was permanently fixed in the bed of the
river, and the plaintiffs had not established that they were possessed
of the said pile, so as to entitle them to sustain the verdict on that
plea.
Jan. 26.-Lush, Q. C., (with him Talfourd Salter,) now showed
cause. The defendant must make out that if I place a pile in the
soil of a navigable river, though I prove it to be necessary for my
business as a wharfinger, nevertheless, though forty years have
passed since I put it there, still it is unlawfully there, and the possession of it has passed out of me. This is a pile put down in front
of a wharf, and necessary to the navigation of the river as regards
the wharf. A person may prescribe for property in the soil even
of a public river as against the crown; and so may one prescribe
for an easement in the soil of the bed of a public river as against
the crown. A chattel does not lose its chattel character by being
placed on the soil of another; the instances of gas-pipes laid down,
and the pipes of water companies, are familiar proofs of the contrary. The maxim, "Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit," is only
a presumption; and here, it is contended, the court will presume
what is most for the benefit of the public. No one can put in the
bed of a navigable river, for his own profit, an obstruction to the
navigation; but this pile was proved to be no obstruction, but an
advantage to the navigation; and the only question is, whether,
under all the circumstances, the pile ceases to be the property of
the wharfinger as against a stranger and a wrongdoer. Rubert vs.
Groves, 1 Esp. 148.
.Pigott,Serjt., and Dowdeswell, for the defendants. There was
no -proof to support the notion that this was a case in which the
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crown had allowed the easement of having fixed a pile in the soil
for the purpose of the better carrying on the trade of a wharfinger.
Assuming (of which there was no proof) that the plaintiffs put it
there, it was a pile driven eight feet into the soil; thus it plainly
became part of the soil; (Amos & Ferard, on Fixt. 241 ; Britt. c. 33,
there cited; and Bract. c. 3, ss. 4, 6) ; and, whilst it remains there,
it belongs to the owner of the soil; and if the plaintiffs had also an
easement in the pile, the owner of the soil might sue for the whole
value, if it were taken away, and also the plaintiffs for the whole
value. That, then, is the test; the pile cannot belong to both parties. There are no authorities opposed to the defendants' view.
Wood vs. Rewett, 8 Q. B. 913, was a case
COCKBURN, C. J.
where two or three of the judges expressed opinions to the contrary
of that view. COLERIDGE, J., asks, "1might the plaintiff not acquire
the easement of having his fender on the defendants' land T', And
Lord DENMAN, C. J., says, "It might be understood by both parties
that the fenders should be deemed a separable chattel. The.question is whether, because the fender in this case has been placed on
the defendants' soil, it became his property as a necessary consequence. I am of opinion that such a consequence never follows of
necessity when the chattel is separable."

And PATTESON, 3., says,

"The general rule respecting annexations to the freehold is always
open to variation by agreement of the parties." On the other hand,
a mill-stone, though disannexed, has been held to be part of the soil ;
and so a part of a steam-engine has been taken to be. WILLrS, J.
This pile is put down for the purposes of navigation, for the improvement of the navigation; if it be removed, the next tide washes away all
traces of its having been there; no property can pass to the owner
of the soil in such a case. Here it has been part of the soil for the
last thirty years at least.
am of opinion that this rule must be disCOCKBURN, C. J.-I
charged. - Not for a single moment do I mean to question the
general proposition; but there may be circumstances, as where the
thing annexed is such as to be severable without injury to the soil,
and where there may have been an agreement between the owners
of the soil and of the chattel, that it shall be severable at the will
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and pleasure of the latter. In this case I think it may be, and that
there are circumstances to show it may be, that this pile was allowed
to be put down in the bed of the river, not with the intention of its
becoming permanently attached to the freehold, and a part of it,
but in consequence of an easement to that effect given to the plaintiffs, or those through whom they claim, with the permission of the
crown, in the bed of the river; and I say so because it seems to
have been admitted that the plaintiffs, or those who preceded them,
had fixed the pile in the bed of the river without any interruption
on the part of the crown or the conservators of the river, of the
right. The pile has been so fixed in the enjoyment of an easement;
it was never intended by the.parties that a right should be acquired
in it by the owner of the soil; it remains, therefore, the property of
the plaintiffs, and that is sufficient to support the verdict for them
on the traverse of the plea of not possessed.
WILLIAMS, J.-I am of the same opinion. There is no doubt
but that "quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit," is true in general;
but putting one's chattel -on the soil of another does not of itself
prove that one parts with the ownership of the chattel ; there must
be such a fixing to the soil, as leads to the inference that it was the
intention, that the thing should become part of the soil. Here was
not only a wharf for the purpose of mooring vessels coming to which
the pile was put down, but there were also steamers coming down
the river; and it was made out, in fact, that persons who take the
benefit of the navigation of the river are accustomed to make the
most of the navigation for all legitimate purposes connected with
the navigation; that was the evidence; and I know nothing in the
law to prevent those who have whaives, along the river, from
having posts and piles put down in the bed of the river connected
with the navigation of the river. I see, however, no pecessity at
present to consider that point; but I quite agree with the Lord
Chief Justice, that there is, in the history of this case, sufficient to
show an accrual to the plaintiffs of the right to put down this pile,
by the allowance of the crown or conservators, for the purposes of
the user of the wharf, for mooring off or at it, but not on the terms
of.the post acceding to the soil, but of remaining the property of
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the plaintiffs, a chattel which they might remove at pleasure.

Wood vs. Hewett, shows that if this pile when put into the bed of
the river, was put into the river, not with the intention, on the part
of its owner, of incorporating it with the bed of the river, but with
the understanding and on the agreement that it should remain the
chattel of the plaintiffs, then they are to have the right to sue any
one who interferes with that which they have a right to, and which
is indispensable to the enjoyment of their wharf.
. CROWDER, J.-I am of the same opinion. This pile is used for
mooring vessels coming up to the plaintiffs' wharf to load or unload;
but the fact, it is said, of putting down this post eight feet into the
bed and soil of the river, caused it to belong to the soil, and become
the property of the owner of the soil as part of the realty; and
therefore the plaintiffs have no right to say that it is their post, so
as to bring an action for damages against a person injuring it. That
was the point reserved, and now before us. I, however, am now of
opinion, that it io by no means a necessary consequence of placing
a pile in the bed of the river, where it is -necessary for the purposes
of the party placing it, having vessels which come to his wharf to
moor thereto, that the pile becomes a part of the soil, and that the
plaintiffs thereby lose the right of treating it as their own chattel.
Here there seems to me to be ample evidence from which an inference
may be drawn, that there was, in the plaintiffs, an easement to place
this pile in the bed of the river for the purposes stated, and that the
plaintiffs have not lost the right to the post, as a chattel, by puttingit into
the soil, which was only done for the purpose of the enjoyment of the
wharf belonging to them.
WILLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. Rule disciarged.

In the Court of Common Bench.
BLAKIIE AND OTHERS VS. STEMBRIDGE.
1. Where a stevedore is appointed by the charterer to superintend the loading of a
general ship, and such stevedore not acting under the orders of the master in

respect of such loading, is guilty of negligence, and causes injury to goods sent
to be carried on board the ship, the master is not liable for such negligence of
the stevedore.
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2. The Gundreda was chartered by her owner to one Gallard for a voyage from London to Port Louis for a certain freight. The captain was to be appointed by the
owner; the stevedore for outward cargo was to be appointed by the charterer,
but to be paid by and act under the orders of the captain. The ship being in
port, but no crew, with the exception of the mate, being on board, the stevedore
and his men went on board for the purpose of loading the vessel. The plaintiff
having paid the broker the freight for the carriage of some sugar-pans, sent them
alongside the ship. The stevedore, in loading the pans, was guilty of negligence,
and injury ensued. He received no orders respecting the loading of the pans
from the master, who was not on board:
Held, that the stevedore was not the servant of the master, and that the master
was not liable for the negligence of the stevedore.

This was an action tried at Kingston before WIGHTMAN, J., when
a verdict was found for the plaintiff, damages 141.
The plaintiffs were the owners of some sugar evaporating pans,
and brought the action against the defendant, the master of a vessel,
for negligently loading the pans, whereby two of them became
broken. The vessel had been chartered to a Mr. Gallard. The
master and mate were to be appointed by the owners. The stevedore
was to be appointed by the charterer, but was to be paid by and act
under the orders of the master. The stevedore, in fact, attended to
the receipt of and loading and stowing of the pans, the master not
being on board.
Bovill, Q. C., having obtained a rule nisi to set aside the verdict
and enter it for the defendant, on the ground that the master was
not liable for the negligence of the stevedore.
Roll and Jacobs now showed cause, and cited Morse vs. Slue,
1 Vent. 190, 238; Story on Agency, ss. 314, to 318; Abbott on Shipping, p. 259, 10th edit. and p. 91.
Bovill, Q. C., and C. Pollock, in support of the rule, 'cited Marquand vs. Banner, 6 Ell. & 1B1. 232.
WILLES, J., delivered judgment. This was an action brought by
the plaintiffs, who are iron-founders, against the master of a vessel,
for alleged negligence in loading some sugar-pans on board the Gtundreda. The declaration alleged that the plaintiffs, at the defendant's
request, delivered the pans to the defendant in London alongside, to
be loaded by him on board the ship and carried therein from London to a port in the Island of Mauritius, and there to be delivered
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by him for the plaintiffs for freight, the act of God, the Queen's
enemies, and the dangers of the seas excepted ; that the defendant
received the pans accordingly, and two of them were broken by the
negligence of himself and servants in loading them. The defendant
pleaded, first, a denial that the plaintiffs delivered, and that the
defendant received the pans for the purpose therein alleged ; and
secondly, not guilty. On these pleas the plaintiffs joined issue.
At the trial before my brother Wightman, at the last Surrey assizes,
it appeared' that the defendant was master of the ship; that she
belonged to John Hilman, and that on the 7th May 1857, she
arrived in the port of London, and was then chartered by the owner
to a person of the name of Gallard, for a cargo for a voyage to port
Louis and back, at a certain specified rate of freight per ton ; 700L
and odds were to be advanced on the vessel sailing from London,
and the cargo-was to be taken in and tendered alongside, at the
charterer's risk and expense ; the captain to sign bills of lading at any
rate of freight not under the current rate ; the ship to be consigned
to the charterer's agents at the ports of loading and discharge, paying one commission of 2 per cent. ; the stevedore for outward cargo
to be appointed by the charterer, but to be paid by and to act under
the orders of the captain. The charterer being thus entitled to take
the cargo to port Louis, took the Gundreda to the agent, Mr.
Thomas. At that time no crew was on board, nor had any been
procured at the time the injury complained off took place; and this
was alleged not to be unusual in commerce. The charterer appointed
George Lock as his stevedore, and he went on board for the purpose
of loading and stowing the vessel in the usual course of business.
The mastef was aware of the terms of the charter-party; he gave
the stevedore no orders, and in no way interfered, but contented
himself, according to his own view of his duty, with occasionally
looking into the hold to see how the cargo was being stowed for the
safety of the ship. The master was not on board when the plaintiffs' pans came alongside, and he no way interfered w'ith them unless
the stevedore could be considered as his agent. The mate was on
board in charge of the ship, but did not interfere with the loading.
The pans in question were sent to London to go by the ship. The
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agent saw the broker and arranged with him for the agreed freight
for the carriage of the pans, and paid the freight, 2501. From the
evidence of the agent, it would seem that he was aware that the ship
was chartered. But it is unnecessary to rely on that circumstance,
because, if he did not know it, although done, it was not the fault
of the owner or the master. If he did, and there was no other
ground on which to dispose of the case, we might have had to consider how far the ruling of my Lord Wensleydale, in the case reported
in 7 Car. & P. 41, Major and anoth~er vs. White and another, bore
upon it. To return to the facts. The pans were sent alongside in
a barge, and thence were hoisted on board by means of hooks and
lugs. During this operation, either by reason of the pans being
lifted by the lugs, or the purchase not being perpendicular, two of
the pans were broken; and it was to recover damages for this injury
that the action was brought. The other pans were safely loaded
and stowed, and bills of lading were given for them by the defendant. At the trial counsel for the defendant contended that upon
this evidence as3uming that the stevedore was guilty of negligence,
the master was not answerable. The learned judge reserved this
question for the opinion of the court, and left to the jury the question of negligence only, which they found for the plaintiff, who
accordingly had the verdict. In Easter Term last the defendant
obtained a rule to enter the verdict for him on the point reserved
at the trial, and the case was argued before my brothers Williams
and Byles, and myself, during last term, when we took time to consider our judgement, which I now proceed to deliver. By the maritime law, in the absence of custom or agreement, it is the duty of
the master, on behalf of the owner, to receive and properly stow on
board goods to be delivered to him alongside. For any damage to
the goods occasioned by negligence in the performance of such duty,
the owner is liable to the shipper. If the damage has arisen from
the misconduct of the master, he is answerable to the owner; if it
happen from the misconduct of the mate, or other of the crew, without fault on the part of the master, it has been considered by the
court, and settled in the case of P. executor vs. Acleson, a case
decided on the 5th Feb. 1841, that the master is not answerable to
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the owners, although it appears to have been taken for granted,
upon the principle asserted by Story, J., in his book, that the master in such case would have been answerable to the shipper. This
duty of the master has, however, in very many cases, been modified
by custom or contract. In some the cargo has been receivable or
deliverable at a distance from the ship's side, as in Co5ban vs. Downe,
5 Esp. 41, and in others his liability has been postponed until the
goods have actually been stowed on board. In the latter class of
cases, a stevedore appointed by the shipper is appointed to perform the ordinary duty of master, which consists in loading and
stowing the goods, and the employment of such an interinediate
agent appears to be of early origin. In the Collections des Lois
Maritimes, by Pardessus, c. 192, of the edition of 1831, to be found
in the second volume of his great work, p. 220, a stevedore appointed
by the shipper is familiarly spoken of, and it is there'laid down that
when the stevedore is so appointed, the master is absolved from any
liability; and the master in another clause is advised for his own
indemnity to stipulate that such agent shall be present on the part
of the shipper to superintend the stowage. It appears, therefore,
that the stevedore has from early times been known as an agent
distinct from the crew, and for his conduct, when appointed by the
shipper, the master is not responsible. This was decided to be the
law, and was held so in ,S'wainvton vs. aarrick, 2 L. J., N. S., 255,
Ex., decided on 25th May 1833, where the ship was hired, and the
charter-party stipulated that the stevedore should be appointed by
the charterer; and there it was held that the master was not answerable even to the owner for damage occasioned to the cargo, the
appointment of the stevedore having entirely relieved the master
from the liability for bad stowage. Bayley, B. in that case made
a suggestion, which probably led to the introduction in this and other
cases, for the security of the owner, of the clause providing that the
stevedore should act under the captain's orders. If this stipulation
were not introduced, the authorities referred to show that the master would not be necessarily, and would not have been liable, and
for this reason, namely, that the negligence which caused the. damage was not that of the master, nor of his agents or servants. Nor,
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in our opinion, could the clause, as framed, in the present case create
any liability on the part of the master for the acts of the stevedore,
except they were done in pursuance and in the execution of his orders.
The stevedore was to be appointed by the charterer in London, to
act for him, and to represent his interests. For this purpose he had
the charge and custody of the goods until they were laden and
stowed on board. The master, on the part of the owners, with a
view to the trim of the ship and the safety of the ship, had complete
control over the stevedore; but there was no stipulation that he
should in any other way assist the latter in the performance of his
duties. The payment of the stevedore was a matter of bargain
between the owner and the charterer, and did not make the stevedore
the servant of the master. lUpon these grounds it appears to us
that, unless the plaintiff can establish that some peculiar or exceptional rule of liability exists with respect to the master of the ship,
the defendant is entitled to the verdict. Upon the argument it was
contended that such a rule did exist. The authorities relied on are,
however, in our opinion, inapplicable and against that view. With
respect to a case of Norse vs. Seue, 1 Vent. 238, that case was
founded upon a contract to carry goods actually delivered to, and
in the custody of, the master on board ship, and he was bound, as
he would have been here, if the bill of lading had been given for the
injured pans, to deliver them in the state in which he received them,
unless prevented by the act of God or the Queen's enemies. The
question in this case is, from what period the goods can be considered in the custody of the master? Another authority relied
upon was Story on Agency, ss. 314 to 318, in which it is stated,
that the case of masters of ships is an exception to the rule previously
laid down as to the non-liability of agents to third peasons for negligence and omissions of duty by themselves and their sub-agents,
and it is there stated, that "the liability of the master is founded
upon the doctrine of the maritime law which treats the master not
merely as an agent contracting on his own behalf as well as for the
owner, but which, upon the broader policy, treats him as in some
sort a subrogated principal and qualified owner of the ship, possess.
ing authority in the nature of an exercitorial power for the time
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being, and his liability, founded upon this consideration, extends
not merely to his contracts, but (as we have said) to his own negligences and nonfeasances, and misfeasances, as well as to those of his
officers and crew. His responsibility for the officers and crew has
this additional reason for its support, that he is thus induced to
exercise a superior watchfulness over their acts and conduct, and if
he were not so made liable for their acts and conduct, he might often
by his connivance in their frauds, misfeasances and negligences or
nonfeasances, subject the shippefs of goods, as well as the owners
of the ship, to great losses and injuries, without their having any
adequate redress. The policy of the maritime law has therefore
indissolubly connected his personal responsibility with that of all
the other persons on board who are under his command, and are
subject to his authority." Upon examination, however, of the
authorities cited by the learned counsel, we find they are confined
to cases of contract and collision. We have not, after diligent
search, found any authority for the position, that a person sending
goods to be laden on board a general ship is entitled to assume,
without inquiry, that the goods are to be shipped and stowed by the
master rather than by the stevedore, and so, without any contract
for any wrong done by the master or the crew, to insist on holding
him liable. The rule to enter the verdict for the defendant will
therefore be made absolute.

In the Court of Excheguer.
THOMPSON VS. ROSS.
1. The plaintiff's daughter was the domestic servant of 'the defendant's father; the
plaintiff having a contract to make shirts, similar contracts to which she had
frequently, employed her daughter at the defendant's father's house, when she
had finished her mistress's work, during over hours and leisure time, and with
her mistresb's knowledge and consent, in helping her to make these shirts.
During this time, and when in defendant's father's service, she was alleged to
have been seduced by the defendant.
HTeld, in an action against the defendant by the mother for the seduction of
her daughter, that this was not sufficient evidence of loss of service to support
the action for seduction.

THOMPSON vs. ROSS.

This was an action brought by the plaintiff, Mrs. Thompson, for
the seduction of her daughter by the deferidant. The plaintiff's
daughter was in the service of the defendant's father as a domestic
servant, and living in his house. The plaintiff had a contract with
the Messrs. Nicolls, of Regent street, for making shirts, an employment in which she had been by them engaged for some time. Her
daughter, in the evenings after she had finished her work for Mrs.
Ross, her mistress, used to help (with her mistress's knowledge and
consent) her own mother in the making of these shirts. The alleged
seduction by the defendant was said to have been when she was the
domestie servant of the defendant's mother, and occasionally occupied
for her own mother in the making of those shirts. The cause was
tried in Middlesex before the Lord Chief Baron, when a verdict
was found for the plaintiff, damages 501., leave being reserved to
the defendant to move to set the same aside and enter a nonsuit, or
a verdict for the defendant on the second issue, that the daughter
of the plaintiff so alleged to have been seduced was not the servant
of the plaintiff. A rule nisi having been obtained accordingly.
Pearce showed cause. The question in this case is, whether the
assistance rendered by the plaintiff's daughter to the plaintiff in
helping her, with her mistress's knowledge and consent, to make
these shirts at her leisure time, or after she had done her mistress's
work of an evening, was not such work as to make the defendant
liable to the plaintiff for the loss of service by seduction. In actions
of this kind the slightest evidence of any service done, has been held
sufficient, even that of making tea or milking cows. POLLOOK, 0. B.
Those were cases where the party lived in the house of those whose
servant she was called. WATSON, B. Suppose the master or mistress of a domestic female servant allowed her to go home for an
hour or so in the evening, and when at home the servant does, either
for her own inclination, or her parents' pleasure, some trifling act,
is she to be considered their servant ? For the purpose of supporting such an action as this, she may then be deemed their servant;
the inclination of the courts of law has been to hold the smallest
act of service sufficient to enable plaintiffs, under such circumstances,
to maintain actions for seduction, making tea, for instance. In
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Bennett vs. Allcott, 2 T. R. 167, Buller, J. says: "It is not
material whether the servant be or be not hired for a year, or
whether she has any wages :" it being sufficient that she is a servant
defacto." And in Irwin vs. Dearman,11 East, 23, damages ultra
the mere loss of service having been given against the defendant
for debauching the adopted' daughter and servant of the plaintiff by
which he lost her service, the court refused to set aside the inquisition. Lord Ellenborough said, this has always been considered as
an action 8ui generi8 where a person standing in the relation of a
parent, or in loeo parenti, is permitted to recover damages for an
injury of this naturp ultra the mere loss of service. In this case
the plaintiff's daughter rendered her mother material assistance in
the course of her engagement and contracts to make the shirts, and
it was such a service as would enable her mother to support this
action against the defendant for his seduction of the daughter, and
the loss to the mother of the daughter's service.
.D. 2. Keane, contra, in support of the rule, was not called upon.
POLLOCK, C. B.-I am of opinion this rule should be made abso-

lute. There was really no service in this case rendered by the
daughter to the plaintiff that can enable her, to support an action,
even such an action as this against the defendant, for what is called
the loss of service, slight evidence of service would do no doubt, but
then it must have been a true genuine service, such as a master or
mistress may command. This was, to make the most of it, but a
mere helping of her mother with the consent of the lady who was
at that time her real mistress; she lived with Mrs. Ross, the mother
of the defendant; and the point mentioned by my brother Watson
during the discussion of the case seems to me to be decisive of it in
the defendant's favor. Suppose a female domestic servant, on a
Sunday evening, was permitted by her master and mistress to go
home, and she went home, and when there made her father's tea;
that would be a similar case, but surely not enough to constitute
such service as would enable her father to maintain an action of this
kind as for the loss of service. Here the service performed for her
mother might, at any moment, have been withdrawn from her mother
by her master or mistress, and Mrs. Ross could have claimed her
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entire time. It may be a hard case on both mother and daughter;
but I do not think the service of the daughter to her mother is here
sufficient, under the circumstances, to enable the plaintiff to support
this action, and the result is that a nonsuit should be entered.
BRAMWELL, B.-I quite agree with the Lord Chief Baron, our
duty is to administer the law as we find it; and the law is, in actions
for seduction, that there should be an actual loss of service by the
plaintiff of the party seduced, and the character of master and servant must exist between them. The question here is, was there
any such relation of master and servant with the mother and
daughter? Certainly there was no evidence of any such arrangement existing; on the contrary, the. evidence shows that the girl was
the servant of Airs. Ross, the defendant's mother, but who allowed
her sometimes to assist the plaintiff in the way that has been mentioned. I do not mean to say that a person may not agree to renper service to one person for one part of a day, and perform other
service for another at a different part of the day, and that either of
such services may be sufficient to maintain an action on an occasion
of their loss; but here there was no- evidence of any such special
contract, and in this case the plaintiff's daughter was the entire servant of Mrs. Ross altogether.
WATSON, B.-I am entirely of the same opinion; the action is
founded upon the loss of service to the party bringing the action.
Now what is the loss really sustained here ? Not of service, but of
the permission of the defendant's mother, her mistress, to go
home, or occasionally to do at her mistress's house a little needlework for her mother. I think the rule should be made absolute.
CHANNEL, B.- I am of the same opinion.
Rule ab8olute to enter a nonsuit.

GOODS OF BERKLEY WESTROPP.

1a the Court of Probate.
IN THE GOODS OF BERKLEY WESTROPP, DECEASED.
The testator, having in one clause of his will left all his personal pronerty to his
wife absolutely, by a subsequent clause gave her only a life interest therein.
Under these circumstances a special grant was ordered to issue, which, after
reciting the two clauses of the will, should authorize the widow to take administration as thb party named in them.

Mr. Berkley Westropp, of Sheen, in the county of Surrey, duly
executed his will, in which, after directing the payment of his debts
and funeral expenses, he continued-" I give, devise and bequeath
all the property whatsoever, and wheresoever situate, which I may
possess at my death, to my wife, Eliza Isabella Westropp; and as
to all the rest and residue of my property, I give it to my two
executors, in trust to allow my wife to have the annual dividend
and produce of the same during the term of her natural life, and
afterwards I give and bequeath the same amongst all my children," &c.
C. JU. Roupell applied to the court, under the stat. 21 Hen. 8,
c. 5, s. 3, to grant administration with the will annexed to Mrs.
Westropp, as widow of the deceased, the executors refusing to act.
Sir C. CRESSWELL -Supposing the grant to issue to Mrs. Westropp as the residuary legatee for life, would her interests be affected
thereby in the Court of Chancery ?
C. A. Roupell thought not, but Mrs. Westropp was unwilling to
any step which seemed to recognize the inferior title.
Sir C. CRESSWELL.-It has always been the practice in the Pre-

rogative Court, in case two residuary clauses were found in a will,
which were inconsistent with one another, to give effect, in granting
probate, to the last disposition. The widow is not entitled to
administration until the residuary legatees have been disposed of.
I think the difficulty may be avoided by your taking a special grant,
in which, after a recital of both clauses, administration may be committed to Mrs. Westropp as the person named in both of them.

